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October 2026 in data: the longest outage was on the calendar

3 November 2026 UptimeProject
data reliability incidents

October’s figures, from the same five probes and the same rules as everything else on the site (methodology). This covers the 46 services measured for the whole month. Ten more joined the registry on 23 October and wait for a full month before they appear in a roundup.

The month in numbers

Bar chart of minutes lost per service in October 2026. Linode 107, GitLab 18, GitHub 17, Quad9 10, GCP Compute Engine us-central1 7, Azure Blob Storage eastus 7, GCP Compute Engine europe-west1 6, Azure Blob Storage westeurope 3, Postmark 2, OVHcloud 1, Backblaze B2 1. Linode's and Quad9's bars are almost entirely down minutes; GitHub's is almost entirely degraded.

Linode: announced, then overrun

On 29 September Linode posted a scheduled maintenance for 28 October, 04:00 to 05:30 UTC. The notice said Cloud Manager, the API and the CLI would be offline, and that running Linodes would not be affected.

Our Linode check calls api.linode.com/v4/regions, so it measures exactly the part that was announced to go offline. What the probes saw:

It was not the first time. Linode’s 66-minute outage on 19 August, from 04:23 to 05:29 UTC, sat inside an announced window for the same systems, also 04:00 to 05:30. That one finished on time.

Our figures do not exclude announced maintenance. A request to the API at 04:30 failed whether or not it was on a calendar, and the leaderboard reports whether services answered. The notice still mattered: anyone who read it could plan around 90 minutes. Nobody could plan around the 19 that fell outside it.

It is also the control-plane case from What 99.99% uptime actually buys you. The API was down for nearly two hours while, by Linode’s account, every running server stayed up. Linode’s figure on our leaderboard describes its API, not its servers.

GitHub: one match, one miss

On 1 October our probes opened GitHub incidents at 13:04 and 13:23 UTC. GitHub’s own incident summary describes “two periods of slow page loads and intermittent request failures” between 13:04 and 13:34 UTC. The start time matches to the minute. GitHub’s first status post went up at 13:37, after both periods had ended.

On 7 October it went the other way. GitHub had two write outages, 15:06 to 15:16 and 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, in which “actions that save or change data failed” across git, pull requests, issues, Actions and the API. Our probes recorded one degraded minute that day.

Both of our GitHub checks are reads: a static file from the web front door, and the first step of an anonymous git fetch from a public repository. Reads kept working, so the probes had nothing to see. This is the limit The endpoint you monitor decides the outage you can detect is about. Measuring writes needs an authenticated check, which we do not run today.

The rest

Minutes that never became incidents

Azure Blob Storage lost 10 minutes in October, 7 in eastus and 3 in westeurope, spread over seven different days. None of them appears on the incidents page. An incident is a run of at least two bad minutes, with gaps of up to two minutes bridged, and Azure’s bad minutes never came close enough together to form one. OVHcloud and Backblaze B2 each lost a single isolated minute.

Those minutes still count against availability. They just never produce an entry in the incident list or its feed.

The data

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